OpenSSL FIPS Provider 3.5.9: FIPS 140-3 validated, post-quantum included
The OpenSSL FIPS Provider, version 3.5.9, has completed FIPS 140-3 validation. NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program has issued certificate #5586 on November 13, 2026, and the approved algorithm list now includes the post-quantum standards published in August 2024: ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key establishment, ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for digital signatures, and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for hash-based signatures.
FIPS 203
ML-KEM
Key establishment: key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation.
FIPS 204
ML-DSA
Digital signatures: key generation, signing, and verification.
FIPS 205
SLH-DSA
Hash-based signatures: key generation, signing, and verification.
For teams that run validated cryptography, this closes a gap that has stood since those standards were published. For OpenSSL users the choice until now was a validated module without post-quantum algorithms or post-quantum algorithms without a certificate. The module that ships with the OpenSSL Library now carries both the validation and the algorithms. Hybrid post-quantum key exchange is already on by default across the 3.5 series.
What the certificate covers
Certificate #5586, issued November 13, 2026, validates the OpenSSL FIPS Provider, version 3.5.9, at FIPS 140-3 overall Security Level 1, with a sunset date of November 12, 2031. The award comes thirteen months after the work was submitted for validation in October 2025 through Lightship Security, an accredited cryptographic module testing laboratory and an Applus+ Laboratories company. The submission was made with provider version 3.5.4. The changes that came out of the five rounds of CMVP comments went into later releases, and the module that completed validation is OpenSSL FIPS Provider 3.5.9. The certificate entry and its security policy on the NIST CMVP site list the approved algorithms, configurations, and tested operational environments. Alongside the classical approved set, the certificate lists ML-KEM key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation, plus ML-DSA and SLH-DSA key generation, signing, and verification. Every approved service also carries an explicit approved-service indicator, a first for the OpenSSL provider. As with every software module validation, the certificate names the exact module version it covers: OpenSSL FIPS Provider 3.5.9. The provider is open source: anyone can build it and use it under the security policy at no cost.
Here is the new certificate next to the two FIPS 140-2 certificates that became Historical in September:
| Certificate | Standard | Module | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| #5586 | FIPS 140-3 | OpenSSL FIPS Provider 3.5.9 | Active, issued November 13, 2026 |
| #4811 | FIPS 140-2 | OpenSSL FIPS Provider 3.0.8/3.0.9 | Historical since September 21, 2026 |
| #4282 | FIPS 140-2 | OpenSSL FIPS Provider 3.0.8/3.0.9 | Historical since September 21, 2026 |
On September 21, our FIPS 140-2 certificates moved to the CMVP Historical List. Historical status is not revocation, and existing deployments keep running, but federal agencies should not reference Historical certificates in new procurements. Deployments still pointing at #4282 or #4811 need a FIPS 140-3 path, and that path now includes post-quantum cryptography.
Hybrid key exchange has been the default since OpenSSL 3.5.0
OpenSSL 3.5.0, released in April 2025, changed the default TLS supported groups so that hybrid post-quantum key exchange is included and preferred. At the top of the default list is X25519MLKEM768, which pairs the classical X25519 exchange with ML-KEM-768. Chrome, Firefox, and Edge negotiate the same group by default today.
The practical consequence: upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5 and your TLS connections use post-quantum key exchange wherever the peer supports it, with no configuration change. Two 3.5 endpoints negotiate it automatically. A 3.5 server facing current browsers gets it on the first handshake. Key material agreed this way is designed to resist harvest now, decrypt later collection, in which encrypted traffic is recorded today in the expectation that a future quantum computer will recover it.
Upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5 and your TLS connections use post-quantum key exchange wherever the peer supports it, with no configuration change.
The default covers key establishment. Certificates and signatures stay classical until the CA ecosystem moves, and ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are in the library for that migration when it comes. OpenSSL 3.5 is a long term support release with security fixes committed through April 2030, and OpenSSL 3.0 reached end of life on September 7, 2026. If you are planning one upgrade, 3.5 is the destination.
What changes for FIPS deployments
Environments bound to FIPS 140 have had to watch the post-quantum migration from the sidelines. A deployment that must run validated cryptography could not ship ML-KEM through an unvalidated provider, whatever the engineering case for starting early. With this certificate that constraint is gone: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA are available inside the FIPS boundary, delivered through the same provider architecture FIPS deployments already use.
The pressure to move is already in writing. OMB M-23-02 directed US federal agencies to inventory quantum-vulnerable cryptography, and NSA's CNSA 2.0 timelines have defense prime contractors and their suppliers asking vendors for concrete post-quantum plans. Until now a FIPS-bound deployment had no validated OpenSSL option with post-quantum algorithms to point to. It does now.
The security policy for #5586 lists three hybrid schemes for TLS 1.3: SecP256r1MLKEM768, SecP384r1MLKEM1024, and X25519MLKEM768. In the last one, X25519 is allowed only as part of the hybrid and carries no security claim of its own; the approved strength comes from ML-KEM-768. Which configuration fits a given compliance posture is a conversation between you and your assessor, and the certificate's security policy is the controlling document. Our team can walk through the options with you.
Hybrid · TLS 1.3
SecP256r1MLKEM768
P-256 with ML-KEM-768.
Hybrid · TLS 1.3
SecP384r1MLKEM1024
P-384 with ML-KEM-1024.
Hybrid · TLS 1.3
X25519MLKEM768
X25519 allowed only as part of the hybrid; the approved strength comes from ML-KEM-768.
A certificate in your own name
Many of the companies we work with need more than a validated library. Procurement teams and federal customers ask for a FIPS certificate that names your company and your product. Our rebranding service delivers that: a certificate in your name in the NIST CMVP database, based on the validated OpenSSL FIPS module, with your operational environments scoped in.
The requirement sharpens if your product goes through FedRAMP or Common Criteria, which expect the operational environments your product runs on to appear on the certificate it cites. A rebrand is the fastest and most cost-effective way to get there: take the certificate in your own name, then extend it with vendor-affirmed or lab-tested operational environments until it covers your deployment matrix.
Ground-up validation
A year or more
In CMVP review alone, with your team running a validation project.
Rebrand against #5586
Measured in months
Included with Engineering and Enterprise support agreements. A FIPS 140-3 certificate with post-quantum algorithms in your product's name.
A ground-up validation runs a year or more in CMVP review alone. A rebrand is measured in months and is included with our Engineering and Enterprise support agreements. The result is a FIPS 140-3 certificate with post-quantum algorithms in your product's name, without your team running a validation project. Rebrands against #5586 are open now: fill out our contact form or write to sales@openssl.org and we will scope it with you directly.
Getting started
If you run OpenSSL, upgrade to the current OpenSSL 3.5 release and your TLS key establishment goes hybrid post-quantum wherever peers support it. If you carry FIPS obligations, start with certificate #5586 and its security policy on the NIST CMVP site, and plan the move off any Historical 140-2 certificate you still reference. The validated module is OpenSSL FIPS Provider 3.5.9. It keeps that version; the rest of the library can be updated with each 3.5 patch release. If you want a certificate in your own name, or help scoping either migration, fill out our contact form or write to sales@openssl.org.
Many of these conversations began at this year's OpenSSL Conference in Prague. The same address is the place to continue yours.
Certificate #5586
A FIPS 140-3 certificate with post-quantum algorithms, in your product’s name.
Rebrands against #5586 are open now. Fill out our contact form or write to sales@openssl.org and we will scope it with you directly.
Sources
NIST CMVP, certificate #5586, OpenSSL FIPS Provider, and its security policy (PDF); CMVP certificates #4811 and #4282 (FIPS 140-2, Historical); OpenSSL 3.5.4 submitted for FIPS 140-3 validation, October 2025; OpenSSL Corporation, FIPS 140 Rebranding Service.